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Abstract
In this paper we introduce public announcement logic in different geo-
metric frameworks. First, we consider topological models, and then extend
our discussion to a more expressive model, namely, subset space models.
Furthermore, we prove the completeness of public announcement logic in
those frameworks. Moreover, we apply our results to different issues: an-
nouncement stabilization, backward induction and persistence.
1 Introduction
Public announcement logic is a well-known and well-studied example of dy-
namic epistemic logics (Plaza, 1989; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007). Dynamic
epistemic logics are set out to formalize knowledge and knowledge changes in
usually multi-agent settings by defining and introducing different ways of up-
dates and interaction. The contribution of public announcement logic (PAL,
henceforth) to the field of knowledge representation is mostly due to its suc-
cinctness and clarity in reflecting the intuition as it does not increase the ex-
pressiveness of the basic epistemic logic. PAL updates the epistemic models by
the announcements made by a truthful external agent. After the truthful an-
nouncement, the model is updated by eliminating the states that do not agree
with the announcement. PAL has many applications in the fields of formal ap-
proaches to social interaction, dynamic logics, knowledge representation and
updates (Balbiani et al., 2008; Baltag & Moss, 2004; van Benthem, 2006; van
Benthem et al., 2005). Extensive applications of PAL to different fields and
frameworks has made PAL a rather familiar framework to many researchers.
Moreover, virtually almost all applications of PAL make use of Kripke models for
knowledge representation. However, as it is very well known, Kripke models
are not the only representational tool for modal and epistemic logics.
In this work, we consider PAL in two different geometrical frameworks:
topological models for modal logic and subset space logic. Topological mod-
els are not new to modal logics, indeed they are the first models for modal
logic (McKinsey & Tarski, 1944; McKinsey & Tarski, 1946). The past decades
have witnessed a revival of academic interest towards the topological models
for modal logics in many different frameworks (Aiello et al., 2003; van Ben-
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them & Bezhanishvili, 2007; van Benthem et al., 2006; Bezhanishvili & Gehrke,
2005). However, to the best of our knowledge, topological models have not
been applied to dynamic epistemic logics. Yet, there have been some influential
works on the notion of common knowledge in topological models which has
motivated the current paper (van Benthem & Sarenac, 2004). In that work,
it was shown that the different definitions of common knowledge diverge in
topological models even though these definitions are equivalent in Kripke struc-
tures, based on Barwise’s earlier investigation (Barwise, 1988). Nevertheless,
the authors did not seem to take the next immediate step to discuss dynamic
epistemologies in that framework. This is one of our goals in this paper: to
apply topological reasoning to dynamic epistemological cases and present the
immediate completeness results. The second framework that we discuss, sub-
set space logic, is a rather weak yet expressive geometrical structure dispensing
with the topological structure (Moss & Parikh, 1992; Parikh et al., 2007). Sub-
set space logic has been introduced to reason about the topological notion of
closeness and the dynamic notion of effort in epistemic situations. In this paper,
we also define PAL in subset space logic with its axiomatization and present the
completeness of PAL in subset space logics improving the results based on an
earlier work (Bas¸kent, 2007).
There are several reasons that motivate this work. First, topological mod-
els can distinguish some epistemic properties that Kripke models cannot (van
Benthem & Sarenac, 2004). This is perhaps not surprising as the topological
semantics of the necessity modality has Σ2 complexity, while Kripkean seman-
tics offer Π1 complexity for the same modality, and furthermore topologies deal
with infinite cases in a rather special way1. Moreover, PAL update procedure
is easily defined by using well-defined topological operations giving sufficient
reasons to wonder what other different structures one may have in topological
models.
The present paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the geometri-
cal frameworks that we need: topological spaces and subset spaces. Then, after
a brief interlude on PAL, we give the axiomatizations of PAL in such spaces, and
their completeness. The completeness proofs are rather immediate - which is
usually the case in PAL systems. Then, we make some observations on PAL in
geometric models. Our observations will be about the stabilization of updated
models, backward induction in games and persistency.
2 Geometric Models
In this section, we will briefly recall the geometric models for some modal logics.
What we mean by geometric models is topological models and subset space
logic models as they inherently are geometrical structures. We first start with
topological models and their semantics, and then discuss subset space models.
1When we discuss the semantics of topological models, we will see the Σ2 complexity of the
aforementioned definition. Moreover, by definition, topologies do embrace infinite unions.
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2.1 Topological Semantics for Modal Logic
Topological interpretations for modal logic historically precede the relational
semantics (McKinsey & Tarski, 1944; Goldblatt, 2006). Moreover, as we will
observe very soon, topological semantics is arithmetically more complex than
relational semantics: the prior is Σ2 while the latter is Π1. Now, let us start by
introducing the definitions.
Definition 1. A topological space S = 〈S, σ〉 is a structure with a set S and a
collection σ of subsets of S satisfying the following axioms:
1. The empty set and S are in σ.
2. The union of any collection of sets in σ is also in σ.
3. The intersection of a finite collection of sets in σ is also in σ.
The collection σ is said to be a topology on S. The elements of S are called
points and the elements of σ are called opens. The complements of open sets
are called closed sets. Our main operator in topological spaces is called interior
operator I which returns the interior of a given set. The interior of a set is the
largest open set contained in the given set. A topological model M is a triple
〈S, σ, v〉 where S = 〈S, σ〉 is a topological space, and v is a valuation function
assigning propositional letters to subsets of S, i.e. v : P → ℘(S) for a countable
set of propositional letters P .
The basic modal language L has a countable set of proposition letters P , a
truth constant >, the usual Boolean operators ¬ and ∧, and a modal operator
. The dual of  is denoted by ♦ and defined as ϕ ≡ ¬♦¬ϕ. When we are
in topological models, we will use the symbol I for  after the interior operator
for intuitive reasons, and to prevent any future confusion. Likewise, we will
use the symbol C for ♦. The notation M, s |= ϕ will read the point s in the
modelM makes the formula ϕ true. We call the set of points that satisfy a given
formula ϕ in model M the extension of ϕ, and denote as (ϕ)M. We will drop
the superscript when the model we are in is obvious.
In topological models, the extension of a Boolean formula is obtained in the
familiar sense. The extension of a modal formula in model M, then, is given
as follows (Iϕ)M = I((ϕ)M) - namely, the extension of Iϕ is the interior of the
extension of ϕ. Now, based on this framework, the model theoretical semantics
of modal logic in topological spaces is given as follows.
M, s |= p iff s ∈ v(p) for p ∈ P
M, s |= ¬ϕ iff M, s 6|= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ andM, s |= ψ
M, s |= Iϕ iff ∃U ∈ σ(s ∈ U ∧ ∀t ∈ U, M, t |= ϕ)
M, s |= Cϕ iff ∀U ∈ σ(s ∈ U → ∃t ∈ U, M, t |= ϕ)
A few words on the semantics are in order here. The necessity modality Iϕ
says that there is an open set that contains the current state and the formula
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ϕ is true everywhere in this set. Obviously, this is a rather complex statement,
first, it requires us to determine the open set, and then check whether each
point in this open set satisfies the given formula or not. On the other hand, the
possibility modality Cϕ manifests the idea that for every open set that includes
the current state, there is point in the same set that satisfies ϕ. This is clearly
reflected in the definition: in topological semantics, the definitions of modal
satisfaction have the form ∃∀ or ∀∃. In Kripke models, as it is well-known, the
form is either ∃ or ∀.
It is been shown by McKinsey and Tarski that the modal logic of topological
spaces is S4 (McKinsey & Tarski, 1944). Moreover, the logic of many other topo-
logical spaces has also been investigated (Aiello et al., 2003; Cate et al., 2009;
Bezhanishvili et al., 2005; van Benthem et al., 2006; van Benthem & Bezhan-
ishvili, 2007). Moreover, recently, the topological properties of paraconsistent
systems have also been investigated (Bas¸kent, 2011c; Mortensen, 2000).
The proof theory of the topological models is as expected: we utilize modus
ponens and necessitation. Basic modal logic is long to be known to be sound and
complete with respect to the well-known axiomatization of topological modal
logic.
2.2 Subset Space Logic
Subset space logic (SSL, henceforth) was presented in early 90s as a bimodal
logic to formalize reasoning about sets and points with an underlying motiva-
tion from epistemic logic (Moss & Parikh, 1992). One of the modal operators of
SSL is intended to quantify over the sets () whereas the other modal operator
was intended to quantify in the current set (K). The underlying motivation for
the introduction of these two modalities is to be able to speak about the notion
of closeness. In this context, K operator is intended for the knowledge operator
(for one agent only, as SSL is originally presented for single-agent), and the
 modality is intended for the effort modality. Effort can correspond to vari-
ous things: computation, observation, approximation - the procedures that can
result in knowledge increase.
The language of subset space logic LS has a countable set P of propositional
letters, a truth constant >, the usual Boolean operators ¬ and ∧, and two modal
operators K and . A subset space model is a triple S = 〈S, σ, v〉 where S is a
non-empty set, σ ⊆ ℘(S) is a collection of subsets (not necessarily a topology),
v : P → ℘(S) is a valuation function. Semantics of SSL, then is given inductively
as follows.
s, U |= p iff s ∈ v(p)
s, U |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff s, U |= ϕ and s, U |= ψ
s, U |= ¬ϕ iff s, U 6|= ϕ
s, U |= Kϕ iff t, U |= ϕ for all t ∈ U
s, U |= ϕ iff s, V |= ϕ for all V ∈ σ such that s ∈ V ⊆ U
The duals of  and K are ♦ and L respectively, and defined as usual. The tuple
(s, U) is called a neighborhood situation if U is a neighborhood of s, i.e. if
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s ∈ U ∈ σ. The axioms of SSL reflect the fact that the K modality is S5-like
whereas the  modality is S4-like. Moreover, we will need an additional axiom
to state the interaction between those two modalities: Kϕ → Kϕ. Let us
now give the complete set of axioms of SSL.
1. All the substitutional instances of the tautologies of the classical proposi-
tional logic
2. (A→ A) ∧ (¬A→ ¬A) for atomic sentence A
3. K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ)
4. Kϕ→ (ϕ ∧ KKϕ)
5. Lϕ→ KLϕ
6. (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
7. ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ϕ)
8. Kϕ→ Kϕ
The rules of inference are as expected: modus ponens and necessitation for
both modalities. Therefore, subset space logic is complete and decidable (Moss
& Parikh, 1992).
Note that SSL is originally proposed as a single-agent system. There have
been some attempts in the literature to suggest a multi-agent version of it, but
to the best of our knowledge, there is no intuitive and clear presentation of a
multi-agent version of SSL (Bas¸kent, 2007).
2.3 Public Announcement Logic
Public announcement logic is a way to represent changes in knowledge. The
way PAL updates the epistemic states of the knower is by “state-elimination”. A
truthful announcement ϕ is made, and consequently, the agents updates their
epistemic states by eliminating the possible states where ϕ is false (Plaza, 1989;
Balbiani et al., 2007; Balbiani et al., 2008; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007).
Public announcement logic is typically interpreted on multi-modal (or multi-
agent) Kripke structures (Plaza, 1989). Notationwise, the formula [ϕ]ψ is in-
tended to mean that after the public announcement of ϕ, ψ holds. As usual, Ki is
the epistemic modality for the agent i. Likewise, Ri is the epistemic accessibility
relation for the agent i. The language of PAL will be that of multi-agent (multi-
modal) epistemic logic with an additional public announcement operator [∗]
where ∗ can be replaced with any well-formed formula in the language of basic
epistemic logic. To see the semantics of PAL, take a modelM = 〈W, {R}i∈I , V 〉
where i denotes the agents and varies over a finite set I . For atomic proposi-
tions, negations and conjunction the semantics is as usual. For modal operators,
we have the following semantics.
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M, w |= Kiϕ iffM, v |= ϕ for each v such that (w, v) ∈ Ri
M, w |= [ϕ]ψ iffM, w |= ϕ impliesM|ϕ,w |= ψ
Here, the updated modelM|ϕ = 〈W ′, {R′i}i∈I , V ′〉 is defined by restricting
M to those states where ϕ holds. Hence, W ′ = W ∩(ϕ)M; R′i = Ri∩(W ′×W ′),
and finally V ′(p) = V (p)∩W ′. The axiomatization of PAL is the axiomatization
of S5n with additional axioms for dynamic modality. Hence, we give the set of
axioms for PAL as follows.
1. All the substitutional instances of the tautologies of the classical proposi-
tional logic
2. Ki(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kiϕ→ Kiψ)
3. Kiϕ→ ϕ
4. Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ
5. ¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ
6. [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
7. [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ)
8. [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)
9. [ϕ]Kiψ ↔ (ϕ→ Ki[ϕ]ψ)
The additional rule of inference which we will need for announcement modality
is called the announcement generalization and is described as expected: From
` ψ, derive ` [ϕ]ψ.
PAL is complete and decidable. The completeness proof is quite straightfor-
ward. Once the soundness of the given axiomatization is proved, then it means
that every complex formula in the language of PAL can be reduced to a formula
in the basic language of (multi-agent) epistemic logic. Since S5 epistemic logic
is long known to be complete, we immediately deduce the completeness of PAL.
Notice again that in this section, we have defined PAL in Kripke structures by
following the literature. In the next section, we will see how PAL is defined in
geometrical models. We will start with SSL and proceed to topological models
with some further observations.
3 Subset Space PAL
In SSL, we depend on neighborhood situations (which are tuples of the form
(s, U) for s ∈ U ∈ σ) instead of the epistemic accessibility relations. Therefore,
if we want to adopt public announcement logic to the context of subset space
logic, we first need to focus on the fact that the public announcements shrink
the observation sets for each agent.
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Let us set a piece of notation. For a formula ϕ, recall that (ϕ)S is the ex-
tension of ϕ in the model S = 〈S, σ, v〉. In SSL, (ϕ)S = {(s, U) ∈ S × σ : s ∈
U, (s, U) |= ϕ}. Define the projections (ϕ)S1 := {s : (s, U) ∈ (ϕ)S for some U 3
s}, and (ϕ)S2 := {U : (s, U) ∈ (ϕ)S for some s ∈ U}. We will drop the super-
script when it is obvious.
Now, assume that we are in a subset space model S = 〈S, σ, v〉. Then, after
public announcement ϕ, we will move to another subset space model Sϕ =
〈S|ϕ, σϕ, vϕ〉 where S|ϕ = (ϕ)1, and σϕ is the reduced collection of subsets
after the public announcement ϕ, and vϕ is the reduct of v on S|ϕ. The crucial
point is to construct σϕ. As we need to get rid of the refutative states, we
eliminate the points which do not satisfy ϕ for each observation set U in σ.
We will disregard the empty set as no neighborhood situations can be formed
with empty set. Hence, σϕ = {Uϕ : Uϕ = U ∩ (ϕ)2 6= ∅, for each U ∈ σ}.
Alternatively, σϕ := {U ∩ (ϕ)2 : U ∈ σ} − {∅} 2.
But then, how would the neighborhood situations be affected by the public
announcements? Consider the neighborhood situation (s, U) and the public
announcement ϕ. Then the statement s, U |= [ϕ]ψ will mean that after the
public announcement of ϕ, ψ will hold in the neighborhood situation (s, Uϕ).
So, first we will remove the points in U which refute ϕ, and then ψ will hold
in the updated set Uϕ which was obtained from the original set U . Then the
corresponding semantics can be suggested as follows:
s, U |= [ϕ]ψ iff s, U |= ϕ implies s, Uϕ |= ψ
Before checking whether this semantics satisfies the axioms of public announce-
ment logic, let us give the language and semantics of the topologic PAL. The lan-
guage of the topologic public announcement logic interpreted in subset spaces
is given as follows:
p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ | Kϕ | [ϕ]ψ
Now, let us consider the soundness of the axioms of basic PAL that we dis-
cussed earlier in Section 2.3. We prove that those axioms are sound in SSL.
Theorem 1. Axioms of the basic PAL are sound in subset space logic.
Proof. As the atomic propositions do not depend on the neighborhood, the first
axiom is satisfied by the subset space semantics of public announcement modal-
ity. To see this, assume s, U |= [ϕ]p. So, by the semantics s, U |= ϕ implies
s, Uϕ |= p. So, s ∈ v(p). So for any set V where s ∈ V , we have s, V |= p.
Hence, s, U |= ϕ implies s, U |= p, that is s, U |= ϕ → p. Conversely, assume
s, U |= ϕ→ p. So, s, U |= ϕ implies s ∈ v(p). As s, U |= ϕ, s will lie in Uϕ, thus
(s, Uϕ) will be a neighborhood situation. Thus, s, Uϕ |= p. Then, we conclude
s, U |= [ϕ]p.
The axioms for negation and conjunction are also straightforward formula
manipulations and hence skipped.
2Thanks to the anonymous referee for pointing out this simple reformulation.
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The important reduction axiom is the knowledge announcement axiom. As-
sume, s, U |= [ϕ]Kψ. Suppose further that s, U |= ϕ. Then we have the follow-
ing.
s, U |= [ϕ]Kψ iff s, Uϕ |= Kψ
iff for each tϕ ∈ Uϕ, we have tϕ, Uϕ |= ψ
iff for each t ∈ U , t, U |= ϕ
implies t, U |= [ϕ]ψ
iff s, U |= K(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ)
iff s, U |= K[ϕ]ψ
Thence, the above axioms are sound for the subset space semantics of public
announcement logic. 
Now, recall that SSL has an indispensable modal operator . One can won-
der whether we can have a reduction axiom for it as well. We start by consid-
ering the statement [ϕ]ψ ↔ (ϕ → [ϕ]ψ). Assume, s, U |= [ϕ]ψ. Suppose
further that s, U |= ϕ. Then, we deduce the following.
s, U |= [ϕ]ψ iff s, Uϕ |= ψ
iff for each Vϕ ⊆ Uϕ we have s, Vϕ |= ψ
iff for each V ⊆ U , s, V |= ϕ
implies s, V |= [ϕ]ψ
iff s, U |= (ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ)
iff s, U |= [ϕ]ψ
Now, it is easy to see that the following axiomatize the SSL-PAL together with
the axiomatization of SSL:
1. [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
2. [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ)
3. [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)
4. [ϕ]Kψ ↔ (ϕ→ K[ϕ]ψ)
5. [ϕ]ψ ↔ (ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ)
Referring to the above discussions, the completeness of subset space PAL follows
easily.
Theorem 2. PAL in subset space models is complete with respect to the axiom
system given above.
Proof. By reduction axioms we can reduce each formula in the language of topo-
logic PAL to a formula in the language of SSL. As SSL is complete, so is PAL in
subset space models. 
By the same idea, we can import the decidability result.
Theorem 3. PAL in subset space models is decidable.
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4 Topological PAL
4.1 Single Agent Topological PAL
We can use the similar ideas to give an account of PAL in topological spaces. Let
T = 〈T, τ, v〉 be a topological model and ϕ be a public announcement. We now
need to obtain the topological model Tϕ which is the updated model after the
announcement. Define Tϕ = 〈Tϕ, τϕ, vϕ〉 where Tϕ = T ∩ (ϕ), τϕ = {O ∩ Tϕ :
O ∈ τ} and vϕ = v ∩ Tϕ. We now need to verify that τϕ is a topology, indeed
the induced topology. For the sake of the completeness of our arguments in this
paper, let us give the immediate proof here.
Proposition 1. If τ is a topology, then τϕ = {O ∩ Tϕ : O ∈ τ} is a topology as
well.
Proof. Clearly, the empty set is in τϕ as τ is a topology. As τ is a topology
on T , we have T ∈ τ . Thus, T ∩ Tϕ, namely Tϕ, is in τϕ. Consider
⋃∞
i Ui
where Ui ∈ τϕ. For each i, we have Ui = Oi ∩ Tϕ for some Oi ∈ τ . Thus,⋃∞
i Ui = Tϕ ∩
⋃∞
i Oi. Since τ is a topology,
⋃∞
i Oi ∈ τ . Thus, Tϕ ∩
⋃∞
i Oi ∈ τϕ
yielding the fact that
⋃∞
i Ui ∈ τϕ. Similarly, consider
⋂n
i Ui where Ui ∈ τϕ for
some n < ω. Since Ui = Oi ∩ Tϕ for some Oi ∈ τ , we similarly observe that⋂n
i Ui =
⋂n
i (Oi ∩ Tϕ) = Tϕ ∩
⋂n
i Oi. Since τ is a topology,
⋂n
i Oi ∈ τ , thus,⋂n
i Ui ∈ τϕ. 
It is important to notice here that only modal formulas necessarily yield
open or closed extensions. The extension of Booleans, then, may or may not be
a topological set as it solely depends on the model.
Now, when we restrict the carrier set of the topology to a subset of it, we
still get a topology immediately and easily. Based on this simple observation,
we can give a semantics for the public announcements in topological models.
T , s |= [ϕ]ψ iff T , s |= ϕ implies Tϕ, s |= ψ
In a similar fashion, we can expect that the reduction axioms work in topo-
logical spaces. The reduction axioms for atoms and Booleans are quite straight-
forward. So, consider the reduction axiom for the interior modality given as
follows: [ϕ]Iψ ↔ (ϕ→ I[ϕ]ψ).
Let T , s |= [ϕ]Iψ which, by definition means T , s |= ϕ implies Tϕ, s |= Iψ.
If we spell out the topological interior modality, we get ∃Uϕ 3 s ∈ τϕ s.t.
∀t ∈ Uϕ, Tϕ, t |= ψ. By definition, since Uϕ ∈ τϕ, it means that there is an
open U ∈ τ such that Uϕ = U ∩ (ϕ). Under the assumption that T , s |= ϕ,
we observe that ∃U 3 s ∈ τ (as we just constructed it), such that after the
announcement ϕ, the non-eliminated points in U (namely, the ones in Uϕ) will
satisfy ψ. Thus, we get T , s |= ϕ→ I[ϕ]ψ.
The other direction is very similar and hence we leave it to the reader. There-
fore, the reduction axioms for PAL in topological spaces are given as follows.
1. [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
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2. [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ)
3. [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)
4. [ϕ]Iψ ↔ (ϕ→ I[ϕ]ψ)
As a result, all the complex formulas involving the PAL operator can be reduced
to a simpler one. This algorithm directly shows the completeness of PAL in
topological spaces by reducing each formula in the language of topological PAL
to the language of basic topological modal logic. Thus, the result follows.
Theorem 4. PAL in topological spaces is complete with respect to the axiomatiza-
tion given.
By the same idea, we can import the decidability result.
Theorem 5. PAL in topological models is decidable.
4.2 Product Topological PAL
There are variety of ways to merge given topological models to express the
epistemic interaction between them: products, sums, fusions etc (Gabbay et al.,
2003). In this section, we focus on one of such methods, product topologies, and
discuss how public announcements are defined in them. Product topological
frameworks for multi-agent epistemic logics have already been discussed in the
literature widely (van Benthem et al., 2006; van Benthem & Sarenac, 2004).
Therefore, our treatment of the subject will be based on these works. Based
on this basic formalism, we will then introduce public announcement logic.
The idea is quite straight-forward. We are given two topologies (possibly with
different spaces) with a modal (epistemic, doxastic etc) model on them. Then,
by the standard techniques in the literature, we merge them. After that, we
discuss how public announcements work in this unified structure.
Let T = 〈T, τ〉 and T ′ = 〈T ′, τ ′〉 be two given topological spaces. Now, we
introduce some definitions. Let X ⊆ T × T ′. We call X horizontally open (h-
open) if for any (x, y) ∈ X, there is a U ∈ τ such that x ∈ U , and U × {y} ⊆ X.
In a similar fashion, we call X vertically open (v-open) if or any (x, y) ∈ X,
there is a U ′ ∈ τ ′ such that y ∈ U ′, and {x} × U ′ ⊆ X. These notions can be
seen as one dimensional projections of openness and closure that we will need
soon.
Now, given two topological spaces T = 〈T, τ〉 and T ′ = 〈T ′, τ ′〉, let us asso-
ciate two modal operators I and I′ respectively to these models. Then, we can
obtain a product topology in a language with the two aforementioned modal-
ities. The product model, then, is of the form 〈T × T ′, τ, τ ′〉. Therefore, we
consider the cross product × as a way to represent model interaction among
epistemic agents which gives us a model with two-dimensional space, and two
topologies.
The semantics of those modalities are given as follows.
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(x, y) |= Iϕ iff ∃U ∈ τ , x ∈ U and ∀u ∈ U , (u, y) |= ϕ
(x, y) |= I′ϕ iff ∃U ′ ∈ τ ′, y ∈ U ′ and ∀u′ ∈ U ′, (x, u′) |= ϕ
Here, given a tuple (x, y), the modality I ranges over the first component
while the modality I′ ranges over the second. In other words, we localize the
product with respect to the given original topologies.
It has been shown that the fusion logic S4⊕S4 is complete with respect to
products of arbitrary topological spaces (van Benthem & Sarenac, 2004). Then,
the question is this: How would a state elimination based dynamic epistemic
paradigm work in product topologies?
Now, step by step, we will present how to define public announcements in
this framework. The difficulty lies in the fact that when we take the product of
the given topological models, we increase the dimension of the space. Then, the
intuition behind defining public announcements should follow the same idea:
the announcement will update the product topology in all dimensions.
Let us now be a bit more precise. Before we start, note that here we focus on
the product of two topologies representing the interaction between two agents
with different spaces and topologies, but it can easily be generalized to n-agents.
The language of product topological PAL is given as follows.
p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | K1ϕ | K2ϕ | [ϕ]ϕ
For given two topological models T = 〈T, τ, v〉 and T ′ = 〈T ′, τ ′, v〉, the
product topological model M = 〈T × T ′, τ, τ ′, v〉 has the following semantics.
M, (x, y) |= K1ϕ iff ∃U ∈ τ , x ∈ U and ∀u ∈ U , (u, y) |= ϕ
M, (x, y) |= K2ϕ iff ∃U ′ ∈ τ ′, y ∈ U ′ and ∀u′ ∈ U ′, (x, u′) |= ϕ
M, (x, y) |= [ϕ]ψ iff M, (x, y) |= ϕ implies Mϕ, (x, y) |= ψ
whereMϕ = 〈Tϕ×T ′ϕ, τϕ, τ ′ϕ, vϕ〉 is the updated model. We define all Tϕ, T ′ϕ, τϕ,
τ ′ϕ, and vϕ as before. Therefore, the following axioms axiomatize the product
topological PAL together with the axioms of S4⊕S4.
1. [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
2. [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ)
3. [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)
4. [ϕ]Kiψ ↔ (ϕ→ Ki[ϕ]ψ)
Theorem 6. Product topological PAL is complete and decidable with respect to the
given axiomatization.
Proof. Proof of both completeness and decidability is by reduction, and similar
to the ones presented before. Thus, we leave the details to the reader. 
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5 Applications
Now, we can briefly apply the previous discussions to some issues in PAL, foun-
dational game theory and SSL. The purpose of such applications is to give the
reader a sense how topological frameworks might affect the aforementioned
issues, and in general how dynamic epistemic situations can be represented
topologically.
5.1 Announcement Stabilization
Muddy Children presents an interesting case for PAL (Fagin et al., 1995). In
this game, we assume that a group of children were playing outside in the mud.
Then, their father calls them in. Children came back in, and gather around the
father in such a way that every children sees all the others, and the father sees
them all. We also assume that there is no mirror in the room, so the children
cannot see themselves. Since they were playing in the mud, some got dirty with
mud on their forehead. Father then announces that “At least one of you has
mud on his or her forehead”. If no child steps forward saying that “Yes, I do
have mud on my forehead” communicating the fact that she learned it from the
announcement, the father keeps repeating the very same announcement (van
Ditmarsch et al., 2007).
In that game, the model representing the epistemics of the group (see the
Figure) gets updated after each children says that she does not know if she had
mud on her forehead. The model keeps updated until the announcement is
negated, and then becomes common knowledge (van Benthem, 2007). There-
fore, after each update, we get smaller and smaller models up until the moment
that the model gets stabilized in the sense that the same announcement does
not update the model any longer.
As van Benthem pointed out, this is closely related to several issues in modal
and epistemic logics (van Benthem, 2007). First, PAL behaves like a fixed-point
operator where the fixed point is the model which is stabilized. Second, there
seems to be a close relation between game theoretical strategy eliminations, and
solution methods based on such approaches. Therefore, it is rather important
to analyze announcement stabilization. Here, we will approach the issue from
a topological angle.
For a model M and a formula ϕ, we define the announcement limit limϕM
as the first model which is reached by successive announcements of ϕ that no
longer changes after the last announcement is made. Announcement limits exist
in both finite and infinite models (van Benthem & Gheerbrant, 2010). For in-
stance, for any model M , limpM = M |p for propositional variable p. Therefore,
the limit model is the first updated model when the announcement is a ground
Boolean formula. In muddy children, the announcement shrinks the model step
by step, round by round (van Benthem, 2007). However, sometimes in dialogue
games it may take too long to solve such puzzles until the model gets stabilized
as shown by Parikh (Parikh, 1991). Similarly, even Zermelo considered similar
12
Figure 1: A model for muddy children played with 3 children a, b, c taken from
van Ditmarsch et al. The state nanbnc for na, nb, nc ∈ {0, 1} represent that child
i has mud on her forehead iff ni = 1 for i ∈ {a, b, c}. The proposition mi
means that the child i ∈ {a, b, c} has mud on her forehead. The current state is
underlined.
approaches in early 20. century to understand as to how long it takes for the
game to stabilize (Schwalbe & Walker, 2001).
Similar to the discussions of the aforementioned authors, we now analyze
how the models stabilize in topological PAL. We know that topological models
do present some differences in epistemic logical structures. For instance, in
topological models, the stabilization of the fixed-point definition3 version of
common knowledge may occur later than ordinal stage ω. However, it stabilizes
in ≤ ω steps in Kripke models (van Benthem & Sarenac, 2004).
We also know that there are two possibilities for the limit models. Either
it is empty or nonempty. If it is empty, it means that the negation of the an-
nouncement has become common knowledge, thus the announcement refuted
3Formula ϕ is common knowledge among two-agents 1 and 2 C1,2ϕ is represented with the
(largest) fixed-point definition as follows: C1,2ϕ := νp.ϕ∧K1p∧K2p where Ki, for i = 1, 2 is the
familiar knowledge operator (Barwise, 1988).
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itself. On the other hand, if the limit model is not empty, it means that the
announcement has become common knowledge (van Benthem & Gheerbrant,
2010).
Theorem 7. For some formula ϕ and some topological modelM , it may take more
than ω stage to reach the limit model limϕM .
Proof. The proof is rather immediate for those familiar with the literature. So,
we just mention the basic idea here.
First, note that it was shown that in multi-agent topological models, stabi-
lization of common knowledge with fixed-point definition may occur later than
ω stage. However, in Kripke models it occurs before ω stage (van Benthem &
Sarenac, 2004).
Also note that it was also shown that if the limit model is not empty, the
announcement has become common knowledge (van Benthem & Gheerbrant,
2010).
Therefore, combining these two observations, we conclude that in some
topological models with non-empty limit models, the number of stage for the
announcement to be common knowledge may take more than ω steps. 
Even if the stabilization takes longer, we can still obtain stable models by
taking intersections at the limit ordinals as a general rule (van Benthem &
Gheerbrant, 2010). Therefore, we guarantee that the update procedure will
terminate. Thus, the following result is now self-evident.
Theorem 8. Limit models exist in topological models.
Yet another property of topological models is the fact that the topologies are
not closed under arbitrary intersection. Then, one can ask the following ques-
tion: “How does PAL work in infinite-conjunction announcements?” The follow-
ing example illustrates that point. Take the real closed interval [−1, 1] with the
usual Euclidean topology. For each n ∈ ω, define the valuation for propositions
as such v(pn) = [−1/n, 1/n]. Therefore, p1 holds in the entire space [−1, 1],
while p2 holds in [−1/2, 1/2]. Consider now the announcements 
∧
n∈ω pn and∧
n∈ω pn. The former formula is true in the interior I(
⋂
n∈ω pn) which is equal
to empty set while the latter one is true in the intersection
⋂
n∈ω I(pn) which
is equal to the singleton {0}. Then, clearly these updates will yield the same
models in Kripke models. But, in topological models, as the extensions of two
formula differ, updated models will clearly differ, too.
5.2 Backward Induction
The fact that limit models can be attained in more than ω steps can create some
problems in games. Consider the backward induction solution where players
trace back their moves to develop a winning strategy. Notice that the Aumann’s
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backward induction solution assumes common knowledge of rationality (Au-
mann, 1995; Halpern, 2001)4. Granted, there can be several philosophical and
epistemic issues about the centipede game and its relationship with rationality,
but we will not pursue this direction here (Artemov, 2009a; Artemov, 2009b).
This issue can also be approached from a dynamic epistemic perspective.
Recently, it has been shown that in any game tree model M taken as a PAL
model, limrationalM is the actual subtree computed by the backward induction
procedure where the proposition rational means that “at the current node, no
player has chosen a strictly dominated move in the past coming here” (van Ben-
them & Gheerbrant, 2010). Therefore, the announcement of node-rationality
produces the same result as the backward induction procedure. Each backward
step in the backward induction procedure can then be obtained by the public
announcement of node rationality. This result is quite impressive in the sense
that it establishes a closer connection between communication and rationality,
and furthermore leads to several more intriguing discussions about rationality.
In this work, we refrain ourselves from pursuing this line of thought for the time
being.
However, there seems to be a problem in topological models. The admissi-
bility of limit models can take more than ω steps in topological models as we
have conjectured earlier. Therefore, the BI procedure can take ω steps or more.
Theorem 9. In topological models of games, under the assumption of rationality,
the backward induction procedure can take more than ω steps.
Proof. Notice that each tree can easily be converted to a topology by taking
the upward closed sets as opens. By the previous discussion, we know that
backward induction solution can be attained by obtaining the limit models by
publicly announcing the proposition rationality. Therefore, by Theorem 7, sta-
bilization can take more than ω step. Therefore, the corresponding backward
induction scheme can also take more than ω step. 
This is indeed a problem about the attainability in infinite games: how can a
player continue playing the game when she hit the limit ordinal ω-th step in the
backward induction procedure? In order not to diverge from our current focus,
we leave this question open for further research.
5.3 Persistence
Let us now discuss stabilization in SSL framework. We already have a similar
notion within the SSL context. Define persistent formula in a model M as the
formula ϕ whose truth is independent from the subsets in M . In other words,
ϕ is persistent if for all states s and subsets V ⊆ U , we have s, U |= ϕ impies
s, V |= ϕ. Clearly, Boolean formulas are persistent in every model.
The significance of persistent formulas is the fact that they are independent
of the subsets they occupy which means that they are immune to the epistemics
4Although according to Halpern, Stalnaker proved otherwise (Halpern, 2001; Stalnaker, 1998;
Stalnaker, 1994; Stalnaker, 1996).
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of the model. Therefore, intuitively, they should also be immune to the changes
in the model. This is interesting due to the fact that now we have a quite strong
way to tell what can and cannot be changed by public announcements in SSL.
Theorem 10. Let M be a model and ϕ be persistent in M . Then, for any formula
χ and neighborhood situation (s, U), if s, U |= ϕ, then s, U |= [χ]ϕ. In other
words, true persistent formulas are immune to the public announcements.
Proof. Proof follows directly from the definitions and the fact that after the pub-
lic announcement of χ, we always have Uχ ⊆ U . 
In other words, we can have some formulas in SSL framework that are im-
mune to the announcements.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, without using Kripke structures at all, we discussed PAL in two dif-
ferent geometrical systems. In subset space logic, we defined dynamic axioms
for both epistemic and dynamic modalities and showed the corresponding com-
pleteness theorems. Moreover, we have applied the geometric ideas to model
stabilization and persistent formulas. This gave us the connection regarding dy-
namic epistemic logics and rationality. We observed that in topological models,
backward induction scheme loses its intuitiveness. There can be some mathe-
matical solutions to this problem. For the backwards induction procedure that
takes longer than ω, modal-mu calculus can also be considered with its natural
game theoretical semantics. Therefore, this can be a further research to see how
> ω-step backward induction scheme gets stabilized.
An interesting fact about topological models of modal logic is that only
modal formulas can give an open or a closed set. However, one can stipu-
late that the extension of any modal formula can be open or dually closed. If
that is the case, one can obtain an incomplete or inconsistent logic respectively
(Bas¸kent, 2011c; Mortensen, 2000). Moreover, some special algebras such as
Heyting and co-Heyting algebras, correspond to those logics. Therefore, the
topological investigation of PAL can be carried out in these special topological
spaces or algebras in such a way that some special logics can further be inves-
tigated. This can also lead to the investigation of PAL in paraconsistent, para-
complete and dialethic frameworks where announcements and models may not
be consistent nor complete.
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